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The theory of mechanism design can be thought of as the “engineering” side of 
economic theory. Much theoretical work, of course, focuses on existing economic 
institutions.  The theorist wants to explain or forecast the economic or social outcomes 
that these institutions generate.  But in mechanism design theory the direction of inquiry 
is reversed.  We begin by identifying our desired outcome or social goal.  We then ask 
whether or not an appropriate institution (mechanism) could be designed to attain that 
goal.  If the answer is yes, then we want to know what form that mechanism might take. 
In this paper, I offer a brief introduction to the part of mechanism design called 
implementation theory, which, given a social goal, characterizes when we can design a 
mechanism whose predicted outcomes (i.e., the set of equilibrium outcomes) coincide 
with the desirable outcomes, according to that goal.  I try to keep technicalities to a 
minimum, and usually confine them to footnotes.
1 
I. Outcomes, Goals, and Mechanisms 
  What we mean by an “outcome” will naturally depend on the context.  Thus, for a 
government charged with delivering public goods, an outcome will consist of the 
quantities provided of such goods as intercity highways, national defense and security, 
environmental protection, and public education, together with the arrangements by which 
they are financed.  For an electorate seeking to fill a political office, an outcome is simply 
the choice of a candidate for that office.  For an auctioneer selling a collection of assets, 
                                                 
1 There are many excellent surveys and textbook treatments of implementation theory that go into 
considerably more detail—both technical and conceptual—than I do here; see in particular: Andrew 
Postlewaite (1985), Theodore Groves and John Ledyard (1987), John Moore (1992), Thomas Palfrey 
(1992), chapter 10 of Martin Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein (1994), Beth Allen (1997), Luis Corchon 
(1996), Matthew Jackson (2001), Palfrey (2002), Roberto Serrano (2004), chapters 2 and 3 of David 
Austen-Smith and Jeffrey Banks (2005), chapter 6 of James Bergin (2005), chapters 14-16 of Allan 
Feldman and R. Serrano (2006), chapter 10 of Eric Rasmusen (2006), Sandeep Baliga and Tomas Sjoström 
(2007) and Corchon (2008).  See also Partha Dasgupta, Peter Hammond, and Eric Maskin (1979), Maskin 
and Sjöström (2002), Baliga and Maskin (2003), and my old survey Maskin (1987).   2
an outcome corresponds to an allocation of these assets across potential buyers, together 
with the payments that these buyers make.  Finally, in the case of a home buyer and a 
builder contemplating the construction of a new house, an outcome is a specification of 
the house’s characteristics and the builder’s remuneration. 
Similarly, the standards by which we judge the “desirability” or “optimality” of 
an outcome will also depend on the setting.  In evaluating public good choices, the 
criterion of “net social surplus” maximization is often invoked: does the public good 
decision maximize gross social benefit minus the cost of providing the goods?  As for 
electing politicians, the property that a candidate would beat each competitor in head-to-
head competition (i.e., would emerge a Condorcet winner) is sometimes viewed as a 
natural desideratum (see Partha Dasgupta and Eric Maskin, forthcoming).  In the 
auctioning of assets, there are two different criteria by which an outcome is typically 
judged: (i) whether the assets are put into the hands of bidders who value them the most 
(i.e., whether the allocation is efficient); and alternatively (ii) whether the seller raises the 
greatest possible revenue from sales (i.e., whether revenue maximization is achieved).  
Finally, for the home buyer and builder, a outcome will ordinarily be considered 
“optimal” if it exhausts the potential gains from exchange between the parties, i.e., the 
house specification and remuneration are together Pareto optimal and individually 
rational. 
A mechanism is an institution, procedure, or game for determining outcomes.  Not 
surprisingly, who gets to choose the mechanism—i.e., who is the mechanism designer—
will, once again, depend on the setting.  In the case of public goods, we normally think of 
the government providing the goods as also choosing the method by which the levels of   3
provision and financing are determined.  Similarly, when it comes to sales of assets—
where an auction is the typical mechanism—the asset seller often gets to call the shots 
about the rules, i.e., he is the one who chooses the auction format. 
In the case of national political elections, by contrast, a mechanism is an electoral 
procedure, e.g., plurality rule, run-off voting, or the like.  Moreover, the procedure is 
ordinarily prescribed long in advance, indeed sometimes by the country’s constitution.  
Thus, here we should think of the framers of the constitution as the mechanism designers. 
Finally, in the house-building example, a mechanism is a contract between the 
home buyer and builder and lays out the rights and responsibilities of each.  Since these 
parties are presumably the ones who negotiate this contract, they themselves are the 
mechanism designers in this last setting. 
Now, in the public framework, if the government knows at the outset which 
choice of public goods is optimal, then there is a simple—indeed, trivial—mechanism for 
achieving the optimum: the government has only to pass a law mandating this outcome.  
Similarly, if the auctioneer has prior knowledge of which bidders value the assets most, 
he can simply award them directly to those bidders (with or without payment). 
The basic difficulty—which gives the subject of mechanism design its theoretical 
interest—is that the government or auctioneer will typically not have this information.  
After all, the net surplus-maximizing choice of public goods depends on citizens’ 
preferences for such goods, and there is no particular reason why the government should 
know these preferences.  Likewise, we wouldn’t normally expect an auctioneer to know 
how much different potential buyers value the assets being sold.   4
Because mechanism designers do not generally know which outcomes are optimal 
in advance, they have to proceed more indirectly than simply prescribing outcomes by 
fiat; in particular, the mechanisms designed must generate the information needed as they 
are executed.  The problem is exacerbated by the fact that the individuals who do have 
this critical information—the citizens in the public good case or the buyers in the asset-
selling example—have their own objectives and so may not have the incentive to behave 
in a way that reveals what they know.  Thus, the mechanisms must be incentive 
compatible.  Much of the work in mechanism design, including my own, has been 
directed at answering three basic questions: 
(A) When is it possible to design incentive-compatible mechanisms for attaining 
       social goals? 
(B) What form might these mechanisms take when they exist? 
and 
  (C) When is finding such mechanisms ruled out theoretically? 
  That is ever possible to design such mechanisms may, at first, seem surprising.  
How, after all, can a mechanism designer attain an optimal outcome without knowing 
exactly what he is aiming for?  Thus, it may be helpful to consider a simple concrete 
example. 
II. An Example 
  Consider a society consisting of two consumers of energy, Alice and Bob.  An 
energy authority is charged with choosing the type of energy to be used by Alice and Bob.  
The list of options—from which the authority must make a single selection—are gas, oil, 
nuclear power, and coal.   5
  Let us suppose that there are two possible states of the world.  In state 1, the 
consumers place relatively little weight on the future, i.e., they have comparatively high 
temporal discount rates.  In state 2, by contrast, they attach a great deal of importance to 
the future, meaning that their rates of discount are correspondingly low. 
  Alice, we will imagine, cares primarily about convenience when it comes to 
energy.  This means that, in state 1, she will rank gas over oil, oil over coal, and coal over 
nuclear power, because as we move down her ranking, the energy source becomes either 






because she anticipates that technical advances will eventually make gas, coal, and 
especially nuclear power much easier to use - - - and, in this state, she lays particular 
stress on future benefits. 
  Bob is interested particularly in safety.  This implies that in state 1, when he puts 
greatest weight on the present, he favors nuclear power over oil, oil over coal, and coal 







which reflects the fact that, in the long-run, the problem of disposing of nuclear waste can 
be expected to loom large, but that oil and gas safety are likely to improve somewhat.   6
  To summarize, the consumers’ rankings in the two states are given in Table 1. 
 
State 1  State 2 
       
Alice   Bob Alice   Bob 
gas   nuclear  nuclear   oil 
oil   oil  gas   gas 
coal   coal  coal   coal 
nuclear   gas 
 
oil   nuclear 
 
Table 1 
  Assume that the energy authority is interested in selecting an energy source that 
both consumers are reasonably happy with. If we interpret “reasonably happy” as getting 
one’s first or second choice, then oil is the optimal choice in state 1, whereas gas is the 
best outcome in state 2.  In the language of implementation theory, we say that the 
authority’s social choice rule prescribes oil in state 1 and gas in state 2.  Thus, if f is the 
social choice rule, it is given by Table 2.
2 
   f (state 1) = oil    f (state 2) = gas 
Table 2 
 
Suppose, however, that the authority does not know the state (although Alice and Bob do).  
This means that it does not know which alternative the social choice rule prescribes, i.e., 
whether oil or gas is the optimum. 
  Probably the most straightforward mechanism would be for the authority to ask 
each consumer to announce the state, whereupon it would choose oil if both consumers 
                                                 
2 In a more general setting, where Θ  is the set of possible states of the world and A is the set of possible 
outcomes, a social choice rule f is a correspondence (a set-valued function)  :, f A Θ →→  where, for any 
() , f θ θ  is interpreted as the set of optimal outcomes in state θ  (we are allowing for the possibility that 
more than one outcome might be considered optimal in a given state).   7
said “state 1,” choose gas if both said “state 2,” and flip a coin between them if it got a 
mixed response.  But notice that in this mechanism Alice has the incentive to say “state 
2” regardless of the actual state and regardless of what Bob says, because she prefers gas 
to oil in both states.  Indeed, by saying “state 2” rather than “state 1,” she raises the 
probability of her preferred outcome from 0 to .5 if Bob says “state 1,” and from .5 to 1 if 
Bob says “state 2.”  Hence, we would expect Alice to report “state 2” in both states.  
Similarly, Bob would always report “state 1,” because he prefers oil to gas in either state.  
Taken together, Alice’s and Bob’s behavior implies that, in each state, the outcome is a 
50-50 randomization between oil and gas.  That is, there is only a 50% chance that the 
outcome is optimal, and so this mechanism is demonstrably too naïve. 
  Let us suppose, therefore, that the authority has the consumers participate in the 
mechanism given by Table 3: 
   Bob 
  Left  Right 
Top oil coal 
Alice 
Bottom nuclear gas 
 
   Table 3 
That is, Alice chooses “Top” or “Bottom” as her strategy; simultaneously, Bob chooses 
“Left” or “Right” as his strategy; and the outcome of those choices is given in the 
corresponding entry of the matrix.
3 
                                                 
3 More generally, a mechanism for a society with n individuals is a mapping  1 :, n gS S A × ×→ "  where, 
for all i,  i S  is individual i’s strategy space and  ( ) 1,..., n gs s  is the outcome prescribed by the mechanism 
if individuals play the strategies () 1,..., . n ss    8
  Observe that, in state 1, Bob is better off choosing Left regardless of what Alice 
does: if she plays Top, then Left leads to oil as the outcome (which Bob prefers), whereas 
Right gives rise to coal.  If she plays Bottom, then nuclear power (Bob’s preferred 
outcome) is the consequence of going Left, while Right leads to gas.  That is, Left is the 
“dominant strategy” for Bob in state 1.  Moreover, given that Bob is going Left, Alice is 
better off choosing Top rather than Bottom, because she prefers oil to nuclear power.  
Thus, in state 1, the clear prediction is for Alice to play Top and for Bob to play Left, i.e., 
(Top, Left) is the unique Nash equilibrium.
4  Furthermore—and this is the critical point—
the resulting outcome, oil, is optimal in state 1. 
  Turning to state 2, we see that Bottom is the dominant strategy for Alice in that 
state.  If Bob plays Left, then she is better off with Bottom than Top because she prefers 
nuclear power to oil.  And if Bob goes Right, then Bottom leads to gas, which she prefers 
to the Top outcome, coal.  With Alice choosing Bottom, Bob is better off going Right, 
because gas is better for him than nuclear power.  Hence, in state 2, the (unique) Nash 
equilibrium is (Bottom, Right): Alice plays Bottom and Bob goes Right.  Furthermore, 
this results in the optimal outcome, gas. 
We have seen that in either state, the mechanism of Table 3 achieves the optimal 
outcome even though (i) the mechanism designer (the energy authority) does not even 
know the actual state, and (ii) Alice and Bob are interested only in their own preferences, 
not those of the authority.  More precisely, because the Nash equilibrium outcomes of the 
                                                 
4 In general, a Nash equilibrium is a specification of strategies—one for each individual—from which no 
individual has the incentive to deviate unilaterally.  Thus, if ( ) , i ua θ is individual i’s payoff from outcome 
a in state  , θ  strategies () 1,..., n ss  constitute a Nash equilibrium of mechanism g in state θ  if 
() () () () 11 ,..., ,..., , ,..., ,..., , ii n ii n ug s s s ug s s s θ θ ′ ≥  for all i and all  ii sS ′∈ .   9
Table 3 mechanism coincide with the optimal outcomes in each state, we say that the 
mechanism implements the authority’s social choice rule in Nash equilibrium.
5,6 
III A Brief History of Mechanism Design 
  The intellectual history of mechanism design theory goes back at least to 
nineteenth-century utopian socialists such as Robert Owen and Charles Fourier.  
Repulsed by what they viewed as the evils of the burgeoning capitalist system, these 
thinkers argued that socialism offered a more humane alternative and sometimes became 
involved in setting up experimental communities such as New Harmony, Indiana. 
  A more direct influence on the modern theory was the Planning Controversy, 
which reached its greatest intensity in the 1930s.  The principal antagonists on one side 
were Oskar Lange and Abba Lerner, who argued forcefully that, done right, central 
planning could replicate the performance of free markets (Lange 1936 and Lerner 1944).  
Indeed, they suggested, planning could correct serious “market failures”—notably those 
on display in the Great Depression—and thereby potentially surpass markets.  On the 
other side, Friedrich von Hayek and Ludwig von Mises staunchly denied the possibility 
that a planned system could ever approach the success of the free market (von Hayek 
1944 and von Mises 1920). 
  The controversy was important and fascinating, but for certain onlookers such as 
Leonid Hurwicz, it was also rather frustrating.  This was because it lacked conceptual 
                                                 
5 In a more general setting, mechanism g implements social choice rule f in Nash equilibrium if 
    () ( )    for all  , g fN E θ θθ =  
where  () g NE θ  is the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes of g in state θ . 
6 Nash equilibrium is a prediction of how individuals in a mechanism will behave.  But a number of other 
predictive concepts—i.e., equilibrium concepts—have been considered in the implementation literature, 
among them subgame perfect equilibrium (Moore and Rafael Repullo 1988), undominated Nash 
equilibrium (Palfrey and Sanjay Srivastava 1991), Bayesian equilibrium (Postlewaite and David 
Schmeidler 1986), dominance solvability (Hervé Moulin 1979), trembling-hand perfect equilibrium 
(Sjöström 1993), and strong equilibrium (Bhaskar Dutta and Arunava Sen 1991)   10
precision: critical terms such as “decentralization” were left undefined.  Moreover, the 
arguments adduced on either side often were often highly incomplete.  In part, this was 
because they simply lacked the technical apparatus—in particular, game theory and 
mathematical programming—to generate truly persuasive conclusions. 
  This is where Leo Hurwicz entered the picture.  Inspired by the debate, he 
attempted to provide unambiguous definitions of the central concepts, and this effort 
culminated in his two great papers, Hurwicz (1960) and (1972), where he also introduced 
the critical notion of incentive compatibility. 
  The work inspired by Hurwicz and others has produced a broad consensus among 
economists that von Hayek and von Mises were, in fact, correct—the market is the “best” 
mechanism—in settings where (i) there are large numbers of buyers and sellers, so that 
no single agent has significant market power; and (ii) there are no significant externalities, 
that is, an agent’s consumption, production, and information does not affect others’ 
production or consumption.
7  However, mechanisms improving the market are generally 
possible if either assumption is violated.
8 
  Hurwicz’s work gave rise to an enormous literature, which has largely branched 
in two different directions.  On the one hand, there is work that makes use of special, 
highly structured settings to study particular questions such as how to allocate public 
goods, how to design auctions, and how to structure contracts.  On the other hand, there 
are studies obtaining results at a general, abstract level, that is, they make as few 
                                                 
7 See, for example, Peter Hammond (1979)—who shows, roughly, that the competitive market is the only 
incentive compatible-mechanism producing individually rational and Pareto optimal outcomes— and 
James Jordan (1982)—who shows the same thing when “incentive compatible” is replaced by “information 
efficient”, under assumptions (i) and (ii). 
8 See, for instance, Theodore Groves (1973) and Edward Clarke (1971) for the case of public goods and 
Jean-Jacques Laffont (1985) for the case of informational externalities.   11
assumptions as possible about preferences, technologies, and so on.  My own work has 
fallen into both categories at different times.  But, in this paper, I will emphasize general 
results. 
IV. Implementation of Social Choice Rules 
  Above I set out three central questions (A) – (C) about incentive-compatible 
mechanisms.  Rephrased in the language of implementation theory these questions 
become: 
(A') Under what conditions can a social choice rule be implemented? 
(B') What form does an implementing mechanism take? 
(C') Which social choice rules cannot be implemented? 
  In the mid-1970s I struggled with these questions.  Eventually, I discovered that a 
property called monotonicity (now sometimes called Maskin-monotonicity) is the key to 
implementability in Nash equilibrium.  Suppose that outcome a is optimal in state θ  
according to the social choice rule f in question, that is,  ( ) . f a θ =   Then, if a doesn’t fall 
in anyone’s ranking relative to any other alternative in going from state θ  to state θ′, 
monotonicity requires that a also be optimal in state θ′:  ( ) . f a θ′ =   However, if a does 
fall relative to some outcome b in someone’s ranking, monotonicity imposes no 
restriction.
9 
  To see what monotonicity means more concretely, let’s consider our energy 
example from before (see Tables 1 and 2).  Recall that oil is the optimal outcome in state 
                                                 
9 In a more general setting in which f can be set-valued, monotonicity requires that, for all states  , θ θ′ and 
all outcomes a, if () af θ ∈  and  () ( ) ,, ii ua ub θ θ ≥  implies  ( ) ( ) ,, ii ua ub θ θ ′ ′ ≥  for all i and b, 
then  () af θ′ ∈ .   12
1.  Notice too that oil falls in Alice’s ranking, relative to both coal and nuclear power, in 
going from state 1 to state 2 (Alice ranks oil higher than coal and nuclear in state 1, but 
just the opposite is true in state 2).  Thus, the fact that gas—not oil—is optimal in state 2 
does not violate monotonicity.  Similarly, observe that gas falls in Bob’s ranking, relative 
to both coal and nuclear power, in going from state 2 to state 1.  Hence, even though gas 
is optimal in state 2, the fact that it is not optimal in state 1 is also not in conflict with 
monotonicity.  Indeed, these verifications establish that the authority’s social choice rule 
satisfies monotonicity (and thus the possibility of implementing it, which was shown 
earlier, does not contradict Theorem 1 below). 
  But suppose we modify the example somewhat, so that rankings and optimal 
outcomes are given by Table 4.  With these changes, the social choice 
State 1  State 2 
       
Alice   Bob Alice   Bob 
gas   nuclear  gas   nuclear 
oil   oil  oil   oil 
coal   coal  nuclear   coal 
nuclear   gas 
 
coal   gas 




rule is no longer monotonic.  Specifically, observe that although oil is optimal in state 1, 
it is not optimal in state 2, despite the fact that it falls in neither Alice’s nor Bob’s 
rankings between states 1 and 2 (given that oil doesn’t fall, monotonicity would require it 
to remain optimal in state 2).  Hence, we can conclude that there is no mechanism that 
implements the social choice rule of Table 4.  More generally, we have: 
Theorem 1 (Maskin 1977): If a social choice rule is implementable, then it must be 
monotonic.   13
  To see why the social choice rule in Table 4 is not implementable, suppose to the 
contrary that there were an implementing mechanism.  Then, in particular, the 
mechanism would necessarily contain a pair of strategies ( ) , AB ss—for Alice and Bob, 
respectively—that result in outcome oil and constitute a Nash equilibrium in state 1. 
I claim that () , AB ss must also constitute a Nash equilibrium in state 2.  To 
understand this claim, note first that Bob has no incentive to deviate unilaterally from  B s  
in state 2, since (i) he has no such incentive in state 1 (by definition of Nash equilibrium) 
and (ii) his preference ranking is the same in both states.  Furthermore, Ann has no 
incentive to deviate from  A s  in state 2.  To see this, observe that if, contrary to the claim, 
Ann gained from deviating unilaterally from  A s  in state 2, she must thereby be inducing 
the outcome gas (because this is the only outcome she prefers to oil in state 2).  But Alice 
also prefers gas to oil in state 1, and so would benefit from the same deviation in that 
state, contradicting the assumption that ( ) , AB ss constitutes a Nash equilibrium in state 1. 
Hence, () , AB ss is indeed a Nash equilibrium in state 2.  But the outcome it 
generates—oil—is not optimal in that state, establishing that the social choice rule is not 
implementable after all. 
  As we have seen, Tables 1 and 2 provide an example of a social choice rule that is 
monotonic and also implementable.  However, it is not true that all monotonic social 
choice rules are implementable; see Maskin (1977) for a counterexample.  Nevertheless, 
such counterexamples are rather contrived, and if an additional, often innocuous   14
condition is imposed, monotonicity does guarantee implementability, if there are at least 
three individuals in society.
10 
  The additional condition is called no veto power.  Suppose that all individuals, 
except possibly one, agree that a particular outcome a is best, meaning that they all put a 
at the top of their preference rankings.  Then, if the social choice rule satisfies no veto 
power, a must be optimal.  In other words, the remaining individual cannot “veto” it. 
  No veto power is especially innocuous—indeed, it imposes no restriction at all—
when outcomes entail a distribution of economic goods across individuals.  In that case, 
each individual will prefer a bigger share of those goods for himself or herself.  So, no 
two of them can agree that a given outcome a is best: they cannot both get the biggest 
share.  This means that, if there are three or more individuals, the hypothesis posited by 
the no veto power condition cannot be satisfied, and so logically the condition holds 
automatically. 
  A general result on the possibility of implementing social choice rules is the 
following: 
Theorem 2 (Maskin 1977):  Suppose that there are at least three individuals.   If the 
social choice rule satisfies monotonicity and no veto power, then it is implementable. 
  Proofs of Theorem 2 are beyond the scope of this paper (see Repullo 1987 for an 
especially elegant argument), but I should mention that they are usually constructive.  
That is, given the social choice rule to be implemented, a proof lays out an explicit recipe 
for the construction of a mechanism that does the trick. 
                                                 
10 That is not to say that implementation is impossible with just two individuals - - indeed, our energy 
example of Tables 1 and 2 had only two individuals.  However, as we will see below, implementation is 
facilitated by there being three or more individuals.   15
  It is worth pointing out why Theorem 2 posits at least three individuals.  Often in 
economics, moving from two to three persons makes things more difficult.
11  But, for 
implementation theory, three individuals actually make matters easier.  To understand 
why, remember that the underlying idea of a mechanism is to give individuals the 
incentive to behave in a way that ensures an optimal outcome.  This entails “punishing” 
an individual for deviating from his prescribed (i.e., equilibrium) strategy.  But if there 
are only two individuals, Alice and Bob, and one of them has deviated, it may be difficult 
to determine whether it was Alice who deviated and Bob who complied or vice versa.  
This problem of identification is resolved once there are three people: a deviator sticks 
out more obviously when two or more other individuals are complying with equilibrium. 
VI Concluding Remarks 
  This has been only a very brief introduction to implementation theory (which 
itself constitutes only part of the field of mechanism design).  I have concentrated on 
work that was done over thirty years ago, which perhaps gives a misleadingly “antique” 
flavor to the paper.  In fact, an especially gratifying aspect of the theory is that almost 
fifty years after Hurwicz (1960), the subject remains intellectually vibrant and important: 
new implementation papers appearing all the time.  It will be interesting to see where the 
field goes in the next fifty years. 
                                                 
11 Zero-sum games provide a classic example of this phenomenon.  The minimax theorem—which greatly 
simplifies the analysis of behavior in games—applies to two-person zero-sum games, but not, in general, to 
the case of three or more players.   1
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